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The present paper studies repeated Bertrand oligopoly with multiple markets. The
markets are subject to independent, stochastic ﬂuctuations in demands. According
to the literature, the demand ﬂuctuations generally hinder collusion, while the mul-
timarket contact sometimes facilitates it. We show that when only partial collusion
is sustainable under a single market, the per-market expected proﬁt under the most
collusive equilibrium increases with the number of markets. Further, the diﬀerence be-
tween the total expected proﬁt under full collusion and that under the most collusive
equilibrium vanishes, if the number of markets goes to inﬁnity. Thus the collusion-
deterrence eﬀects of ﬂuctuated demands completely disappear in the limit.
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1 Introduction
The present paper studies a model of repeated Bertrand oligopoly, highlighting two typical
features colluding ﬁrms often confront. First, they simultaneously interact in two or more
markets (multimarket contact). Second, the demands in those markets are subject to
random shocks (demand ﬂuctuations). For instance, large nationwide ﬁrms often compete
in many local markets simultaneously, and each local market is aﬀected with idiosyncratic
demand shocks. Another example is conglomerates competing over several industries, each
of which has its own demand shocks.
In a framework of inﬁnitely repeated games, existing results have clariﬁed whether
each of the two features facilitates or hinders formation of cartels. First, Bernheim and
Whinston [1] point out that the multimarket contact never hinders collusion and sometimes
facilitates it. In contrast, demand ﬂuctuations generally hinder collusion, as Rotemberg
and Saloner [5] show. The main purpose of the present paper is to examine how these two
conﬂicting forces interact and aﬀect the ﬁrms’ ability to collude.
The present paper sets up a model of inﬁnitely repeated games with symmetric and
stochastic stage payoﬀs. The stage payoﬀs are i.i.d. over time. At the beginning of each
period the players learn the stage payoﬀs of that period; all future payoﬀs are unknown
at that time. This formulation of payoﬀ ﬂuctuations follows Rotemberg and Saloner [5].
While our model includes ﬁrst-price auctions and moral hazard in teams as examples, we
mainly apply it to Bertrand oligopoly and its multimarket version.
We focus on the most cooperative equilibrium (MCE); namely, the equilibrium which
attains the greatest expected payoﬀ among all symmetric subgame perfect equilibria of
this repeated game. We start with a characterization of the MCE expected payoﬀ, which
we call the most cooperative payoﬀ (MCP), for any level of discounting, which we utilize
in examining the eﬀects of multimarket contact under ﬂuctuated demands.
Our main results are summarized as follows. Fix the probability distribution of stage
payoﬀs. Then two threshold discount factors exist, δ and δ with δ > δ, such that regardless
of the number of markets, (i) if δ < δ, the MCE is repeated play of a static equilibrium, and
(ii) if δ ≥ δ, the MCE attains full collusion. These are two polar cases where multimarket
contact is irrelevant. Next, ﬁx δ ∈ (δ, δ). Then we show that for any M , the per-market
MCP under M markets is not greater than that under M +1 markets, and they are equal
only in rare cases to be explained later. That is, on this range of discount factors, adding
one more market almost always improves the per-market MCP.
Further, we show that the diﬀerence between the total expected proﬁt under full collu-
sion and the MCP converges to zero, if the number of markets goes to inﬁnity. Hence, for
relatively patient ﬁrms, the collusion-deterrence eﬀects of ﬂuctuated demands completely
vanish in the limit.1 Another interpretation is that if the ﬁrms compete in a large number
of markets, demand ﬂuctuations do not much aﬀect their ability to collude.
We are not the ﬁrst to study the eﬀect of multimarket contact under demand ﬂuctu-
ations. Bernheim and Whinston [1] have already studied the case of two markets, and
show that the multimarket contact in general increases the per-market expected proﬁt in
comparison with the case of one market. In contrast, we consider an arbitrary number of
1The result does not entirely deny the collusion-deterrence eﬀects of demand ﬂuctuations in the following
two senses. First, if δ ≤ δ < δ, full collusion cannot be sustained under any number of markets. Second,
the limit result does not hold at δ.
1
markets and verify that any possible proﬁt loss due to demand ﬂuctuations goes to zero
when the number of markets goes to inﬁnity.
An independent work by Li and Powell [3] is most closely related to the present paper.
[3] also considers repeated games where multiple identical games with ﬂuctuating payoﬀs
are simultaneously played, and obtains a similar limit result. Both papers assume similar
payoﬀ structure, but the one in [3] is more general. A major diﬀerence is that their limit
result is about equilibrium payoﬀs per component game, while ours examines equilibrium
total payoﬀs and it is therefore stronger as a limit result.2
One important assumption in our setup is perfect monitoring; the players can directly
observe their past actions. This assumption considerably simpliﬁes analysis, enabling us
to fully characterize the MCP. A more realistic assumption would be that the players
only receive a noisy signal of their actions (imperfect monitoring). Matsushima [4] and
Kobayashi and Ohta [2] investigate the eﬀect of multimarket contact under imperfect
monitoring, especially its role in promoting cooperation and/or collusion.3 [2] derives the
most cooperative symmetric equilibrium payoﬀ for any number of markets, assuming that
the players are suﬃciently patient. We rather consider the case of impatient players. [4]
deals with the case of heavy discounting and is concerned with a limit result for the per-
market proﬁt. We instead consider any number of markets, and our limit result is for the
total proﬁt.
The rest of the present paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 characterizes the MCP. Section 4 applies the result in the previous section and
studies eﬀects of multimarket contact under demand ﬂuctuations.
2 Model
Two players play a given normal-form game every period.4 Each player has an identical
set of stage actions, denoted by X. Their stage payoﬀ depends not only on the action
pair selected in the period, denoted by (x1, x2) ∈ X × X, but also on the state of that
period. The set of possible states has M + 1 elements, and we call them state 0, state 1,
. . . , state M . ui(x1, x2, k) denotes player i’s stage payoﬀ of the action pair (x1, x2) under
state k. We assume symmetry, so that for any x1, x2 and k, u1(x1, x2, k) = u2(x2, x1, k).
For x ∈ X and k, we deﬁne U(x, k) = ui(x, x, k).5
We make the following assumptions, which capture some features of Bertrand compe-
tition. The stage game may as well be called games with proportional temptations.
Assumption 1 The state of each period follows a common probability distribution, and it
is independent over time. For any given period, the state of that period is k with probability
pk ∈ (0, 1).
Assumption 2 For any k, Δk ≡ maxx∈X U(x, k) exists, and Δk > 0 holds.
2For example, suppose that the per-market expected proﬁt under full collusion is 1. Then the limit
result in [3] is consistent with a conclusion that the MCP is M −√M , when the number of markets is M .
Our limit result in terms of the total proﬁts reveals that this conclusion is impossible.
3In [2] and [4], the stage game is a prisoners’ dilemma. Since our stage game is quite similar to their
games, the main diﬀerence among those models is attributed to the players’ monitoring ability.
4An extension to the case of three or more players is straightforward.
5Due to symmetry, U(x, k) does not depend on choice of i.
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Assumption 3 There exists K > 1 such that for any k and any u ∈ [0,Δk], x ∈ X exists
such that
U(x, k) = u, sup
y∈X
u1(y, x, k) = Ku. (1)
Moreover, for any k, any u ∈ (0,Δk], and any x′ ∈ X such that U(x′, k) = u, we have
supy u1(y, x′, k) ≥ Ku.
Assumption 4 For each k, minx∈X supy∈X u1(y, x, k) exists and equals zero. Moreover,
the normal form game whose payoﬀ function is given by ui(x1, x2, k) for each player i has
a unique Nash equilibrium payoﬀ pair.
Assumption 5 We have Δ0 ≤ Δ1 ≤ · · · ≤ ΔM , and Δ0 < ΔM .
Assumption 1 states that the states are i.i.d. over time. Assumption 2 guarantees
existence of a maximum symmetric action pair payoﬀ under any state, which is the value
of full cooperation under that state. Together with Assumption 4, the maximum is greater
than each player’s minmax value given the state.6
Assumption 3 is the assumption of proportional temptations. It ﬁrst states that given
a state k, any payoﬀ between the maximum symmetric action pair payoﬀ and the minmax
value is attained by some symmetric action pair (x, x). Further, each player ﬁnds x
suboptimal against x unless U(x, k) = 0, and he can obtain either exactly or approximately
K times of U(x, k).7 Note that the coeﬃcient K is independent of k. For k and u ∈ [0,Δk],
let x(u; k) be an element of X satisfying (1). Assumption 3 also states that any other
symmetric action pair (x′, x′) with a payoﬀ u ∈ (0,Δk] under state k does not give each
player a smaller temptation than x(u; k); we have supy u1(y, x′, k) ≥ Ku.
Evaluating (1) at u = 0, we see that
(
x(0; k), x(0; k)
)
is a Nash equilibrium of the game
whose payoﬀ function is ui(x1, x2, k) for each player i, and each player’s equilibrium payoﬀ
is 0. Assumption 4 states that it is the only Nash equilibrium payoﬀ and the minmax value
of that game.8 Since we will exclude randomized actions, the minmax value is deﬁned by
pure actions. Finally, Assumption 5 states that the states are ordered so that the values
of full cooperation are nondecreasing, and that the values are not constant.
Let us denote this stage game by G. G has a unique Nash equilibrium payoﬀ pair
(0, 0), and it is an equilibrium for each player to play x(0; k) if the state is k.
We provide three examples of games satisfying Assumptions 2–5.
Example 1 (Bertrand oligopoly) Let X = [0, p] with p > 0. For each k, let
u1(x1, x2, k) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
x1D(x1; k) if x1 < x2,
1
2x1D(x1; k) if x1 = x2,
0 if x1 > x2,
6Precisely speaking, the value is the minimum of suprema, but we abuse terminology and call it the
minmax value.
7While (1) is stated in terms of player 1, the counterpart for player 2 also holds by symmetry.
8This is consistent with multiple Nash equilibria, because more than one x may satisfy (1) at u = 0.
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where D(·; k) is continuous and nonincreasing. We also assume D(0; k) > D(p; k) = 0. u2
is derived from u1 by symmetry. This is a standard model of Bertrand duopoly, where the






By assumption, Δk = maxx∈X U(x, k) exists, and Δk > 0. Assumption 2 thus holds.
For u ∈ [0,Δk], let x(u; k) be the smallest x ∈ X such that U(x, k) = u. Since U(x, k) is
continuous in x, x(u; k) indeed exists. By the deﬁnition of x(u; k), we have xD(x; k) < 2u





y, x(u; k), k
)
= 2u. (2)
Furthermore, for any x such that U(x, k) = u, we have x ≥ x(u; k). Since u1(x1, x2, k) is
nondecreasing in x2, it holds that
sup
y∈X




y, x(u; k), k
)
= 2u. (3)
Since u ∈ [0,Δk] is arbitrary, (2) and (3) imply that Assumption 3 holds for K = 2.
In the normal-form game with player i’s payoﬀ function being ui(x1, x2, k), its Bertrand
structure immediately means that each ﬁrm’s equilibrium proﬁt is zero, and this equals
its minmax value. Thus Assumption 4 is satisﬁed.
Finally, Assumption 5 holds if we assume D(p; k) > D(p; k − 1) for any k ≥ 1 and
any p < p. However, it holds under much weaker assumptions. While it does not hold if
we just assume D(p; k) ≥ D(p; k − 1) for any k ≥ 1 and any p (then it is possible that
Δ0 = Δ1 = · · · = ΔM ), it will hold under suitable strengthening of it.
Example 2 (ﬁrst-price auctions) Let X = [0,∞). For each k, let
u1(x1, x2, k) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
vk − x1 if x1 > x2 and x1 ≥ rk,
1
2(vk − x1) if x1 = x2 ≥ rk,
0 if x1 < min{rk, x2},
where vk > rk ≥ 0. u2 is derived from u1 by symmetry. This is a ﬁrst-price auction where





2(vk − x) if x ≥ rk,
0 if x < rk.
It is easy to see that Δk = (vk − rk)/2 > 0. Assumption 2 is therefore satisﬁed.
For any k and any u ∈ [0,Δk], a solution of U(x, k) = u is x = vk − 2u, and it is a









Assumption 3 holds for K = 2.
For each k, the normal form game with player i’s payoﬀ function being ui(x1, x2, k)
has Bertrand structure. Hence, any equilibrium payoﬀ is zero, which equals each buyer’s
minmax value. Assumption 4 is therefore satisﬁed. Finally, Assumption 5 is satisﬁed if
we assume vk − rk is nondecreasing and v0 − r0 < vM − rM .
Example 3 (linear payoﬀs and multiplicative shocks) Let X = [0, 1], and let
u1(x1, x2, k) = θk(αx2 − x1), u2(x1, x2, k) = θk(αx1 − x2)
for each k, where θk > 0 and α > 1. Therefore we have U(x, k) = θk(α − 1)x, and
Δk = θk(α− 1) > 0. Hence Assumption 2 is satisﬁed.




















(1) holds for K = α/(α− 1) > 1. Assumption 3 is therefore satisﬁed.
In the normal-form game with player i’s payoﬀ function being ui(x1, x2, k), 0 is a
dominant action and minmaxes the other player. Hence 0 is indeed the Nash equilibrium
payoﬀ and the minmax value, which guarantees Assumption 4. Finally, Assumption 5
holds if we assume θ0 ≤ θ1 ≤ · · · ≤ θM with θ0 < θM .
This is a game with very simple structure, but it includes moral hazard in teams and
public goods provision with linear technology as examples.
Note that in all these examples, Δk is the maximum of the stage payoﬀ sum, even if we
take asymmetric action pairs into account under state k.
The players play G in periods 0, 1, 2, . . . . Each player knows the state of each period
at the beginning of that period, but does not know the state of any future period until
that period arrives. We also assume perfect monitoring. Namely, the players can observe
the other players’ past actions, together with all past states. In the present paper, we
limit attention to pure strategies. Thus each player i’s strategy of this repeated game









, where xi(τ) is player i’s action in period τ and k(τ) is the realized state of
period τ , to an element of X. Note that a history at period t includes the state of









where δ ∈ (0, 1) is a common discount factor, and the expectation is taken with respect
to the states of the entire periods.
Let us denote this inﬁnitely repeated game by G(δ). A strategy pair is symmetric if
at no history the players’ actions are diﬀerent. Our solution concept for G(δ) is the most
cooperative equilibrium (MCE), which we deﬁne as the equilibria attaining the largest ex-
pected payoﬀ among all symmetric subgame perfect equilibria of G(δ). The MCE expected
payoﬀ is called the most cooperative payoﬀ (MCP).
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3 Characterization of the MCP
This section fully characterizes the MCP of G(δ) for any δ. The following function deﬁned








(1− δ)(K − 1)
}
.
The idea of this function is closely related to the following strategy pair with the payoﬀ
target B.




























On the path of this strategy pair, the players fully cooperate under any state whose
payoﬀ from full cooperation is below the target B, and they play actions achieving the
target under any state whose payoﬀ from full cooperation exceeds it. At any history on
the path whose current state is k, the stage payoﬀ under this strategy pair is min{Δk, B}.
From Assumption 3, the incremental stage payoﬀ from a deviation at such a history is at
most (K − 1)B. Since the continuation payoﬀ given a deviation is zero, this strategy pair
is an equilibrium if




Hence, for any b such that g(b) ≤ 0, the corresponding strategy pair with the payoﬀ target
B = δb/
{
(1 − δ)(K − 1)} is an equilibrium. Note that g(b) measures the gain from the
most proﬁtable deviation.
Note that g is continuous and convex.9 Since g(0) = 0 and g(b) > 0 for any large
b, the set of all b’s with g(b) ≤ 0 has the form [0, b∗]. Note that b∗ depends on δ,
and we have g(b∗) = 0. Hence, the corresponding strategy pair with the payoﬀ target
B∗ = δb∗/
{
(1− δ)(K − 1)} is an equilibrium, and its payoﬀ is b∗.
Proposition 1 For any δ, b∗ is the MCP of G(δ).
Proof. Fix an MCE of G(δ), and let b be its payoﬀ. For each k, let Bk be the stage-game
payoﬀ of the initial period when its state is k. Deﬁne bˆ =
∑M
k=0 pkBk. Since b is the MCP,
we have b ≤ bˆ (otherwise, the expected continuation equilibrium payoﬀ is greater than b,
a contradiction).
From Assumption 3 and the deﬁnition of b, the equilibrium condition implies
(1− δ)(K − 1)Bk ≤ δb ≤ δbˆ (4)
9It is piecewise linear, and its slope is nondecreasing.
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(1− δ)(K − 1)
}
(5)
for any k. Taking expectations of (5), we obtain g(bˆ) ≤ 0. By the deﬁnition of bˆ and b∗,
we have b ≤ bˆ ≤ b∗. Since we have seen that b∗ is an equilibrium payoﬀ, we have b = b∗ as
desired. Q.E.D.




, δ ≡ (K − 1)ΔM




It is easy to see that δ < δ.
We have four cases to consider. First, if δ < δ, g(b) > 0 for any b > 0. Hence, the
MCP is zero. The discount factor is so small that any positive payoﬀ cannot be sustained
as an equilibrium, and the repeated play of a symmetric stage equilibrium is an MCE.
Second, if δ = δ, g(Δ0) = 0 and g(b) > 0 for any b > Δ0. Hence, the MCP is Δ0. The
MCE attains a positive payoﬀ, but it plays as if the current state was zero even under
other states. The players thus suﬀer from burden of payoﬀ ﬂuctuations.
Third, if δ ≥ δ, g(b) ≤ 0 if and only if b ≤ ∑Mk=0 pkΔk. Hence, the MCP is the
expected value of the payoﬀs from full cooperation, the best possible payoﬀ of this game.
The discount factor is so large that the players can fully cooperate.
Finally, if δ ∈ (δ, δ), the MCP belongs to the interval (Δ0,
∑M
k=0 pkΔk). The players
partially cooperate, and due to the above observations, the MCP is continuous and strictly
increasing on the range [δ, δ]. Thus, more patience reduces the loss from ﬂuctuated payoﬀs.
In all cases, the MCE has a payoﬀ target B. Namely, in its cooperative phase, the
players play a symmetric action pair whose payoﬀ is min{Δk, B} under state k. When the
MCE only attains partial cooperation, they must give up full cooperation under higher
states.10 This is an eﬃcient way to provide incentives, because the incentive conditions
under higher states are duplicated.
If δ > δ, we have g(Δ0) < 0. Since g is convex, this implies that b > Δ0 such that
g(b) = 0 is unique. Hence, it suﬃces to solve g(b) = 0, as the following corollary shows.
Corollary 1 If δ > δ and g(b) = 0 for b > Δ0, then b is the MCP of G(δ).
4 Multimarket Contact
This section applies the results in the previous section to Bertrand price competition with
demand ﬂuctuations, in order to examine eﬀects of multimarket contact. We ﬁrst describe
the environment and then set it up as a game satisfying all assumptions.
There are M ex ante identical markets, and in each market two identical ﬁrms compete
in price. Each market is subject to demand ﬂuctuations, depending on which it is either
10If the discount factor is so small that no cooperation is possible, the target is zero. If it is so large that
full cooperation is possible, the target can be set so high that it never binds.
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in high demand or low demand. The demands are independent across the markets and
over time. The probability that a given market is in high demand is μ ∈ (0, 1). We assume
that each market is associated with the Bertrand price competition game we described in
Example 1, except that we now have only two states; ones corresponding to high and low
demands, respectively. Let πH (πL, respectively) be each ﬁrm’s proﬁt under full collusion
(the value corresponding to Δk), when the demand is high (low). We assume πH > πL > 0.
Deﬁne π = μπH + (1− μ)πL, which is the expected value of full collusion per market.
At the beginning of each period, the ﬁrms learn which of the M markets are in high
demand in that period. Given that, they decide prices in all markets. Formally, the
number of states is 2M , and the set of actions is X = [0, p]M . Since each market satisﬁes
all assumptions with K = 2, it is easy to see that this environment also satisﬁes all
assumptions with K = 2. Note that the maximum symmetric action pair proﬁt for a given
state depends only on the number of high-demand markets. Thus, for l ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,M},
let Δl be the maximum symmetric action pair proﬁt when l markets are in high demand:
Δl = lπH + (M − l)πL > 0.
Let us denote the repeated game with this stage game by G(δ,M).












M/M as the per-market MCP of G(δ,M).
The following observations immediately follow from the analysis in the previous section.
(I) If δ < δ, b∗M = β
∗
M = 0 for any M . Therefore any collusion is impossible, regardless
of the number of markets. In this case, multimarket contact does not help at all.
(II) If δ = δ, b∗M = MπL and β
∗
M = πL for any M . That is, independent of the number
of markets, the MCP equals the value of full collusion when all markets are in low
demand. This is another case where multimarket contact does not help.
(III) If δ ≥ δ, b∗M = Mπ and β∗M = π for any M . Namely, the ﬁrms can fully collude
regardless of the number of markets. In this case, multimarket contact does not
matter.
The remaining case is δ < δ < δ. Since the proﬁt from full collusion given a state
depends only on the number of high-demand markets, the condition for the MCE (g(b∗M) =






















where pk is the probability that k markets are in high demand. In what follows, we
examine how the MCP and the per-market MCP vary with M .
Proposition 2 Let δ ∈ (δ, δ). For any M ≥ 1, we have β∗M ≤ β∗M+1, and the equality
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holds if and only if there exists kˆ ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M − 1} such that
δb∗M
1− δ = Δkˆ. (7)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2 reveals that for relatively patient ﬁrms which can only partially collude,
adding one more market never reduces the per-market MCP and increases it except when
the condition (7) holds. For a ﬁxed M , we have seen that the MCP is increasing on the
range (δ, δ). Therefore, (7) holds only at M − 1 discount factors. In other words, adding
one more market facilitates collusion for almost all discount factors on the range.
If M = 1, the condition (7) is vacuous. Further, suppose (7) holds under some M and
kˆ ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M − 1}, and therefore we have β∗M = β∗M+1. Then it follows that
kˆπH + (M + 1− kˆ)πL <
δb∗M+1
1− δ < (kˆ + 1)πH + (M − kˆ)πL.
From these observations we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2 Let δ ∈ (δ, δ). Then we have (i) β∗1 < β∗2 , and (ii) for any M ≥ 1 and any
M ′ ≥ M + 2, β∗M < β∗M ′.
Why do these results hold? Recall that the MCE has a proﬁt target, and let B be
that of the MCE under M markets. In the proof, we show that under M + 1 markets, a
strategy pair whose proﬁt target is (M +1)B/M has a per-market proﬁt not smaller than
the per-market MCP under M markets. Since the per-market proﬁt target remains the
same (and equals B/M), this strategy pair gives the ﬁrms the same per-market temptation
to deviate. Hence, this strategy pair is an equilibrium, and adding one more market is
shown to (weakly) improve the per-market MCP.
Suppose k out of the M + 1 markets are in high demand. If we ignore the (M + 1)-
th market, we can compare with the case of M markets. Conditional on this event, the
incremental per-market proﬁt of having one more market is
min
{












+ (M + 1− k)min{ΔkM , BM }
M + 1
.
This is because the (M + 1)-th market is in high demand with probability k/(M + 1),
conditional on that there are k high-demand markets.
If the new strategy pair prescribes full collusion given k high-demand markets, the
MCE under M markets also prescribes full collusion given k − 1 high-demand markets.
Hence, the incremental proﬁt is zero if it also prescribes full collusion given k high-demand
markets. However, this is not always the case. The MCE under M markets may prescribe
partial collusion (to the proﬁt target level) given k high-demand markets. The incremental
proﬁt is positive in this case. Note that this happens at most one k; the smallest k at
which the MCE prescribes partial collusion.
Instead, if k prescribes partial collusion given k high-demand markets, the MCE under
M markets also prescribes partial collusion given k high-demand markets. Hence, the
incremental proﬁt is zero if it also prescribes partial collusion given k − 1 high-demand
markets. However, this is not always the case. The MCE under M markets may prescribe
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full collusion given k − 1 high-demand markets. The incremental proﬁt is positive in this
case. Note that this happens at most one k; again, the smallest k at which the MCE
prescribes partial collusion.
To sum up, the incremental proﬁt can be positive only at one k, and is zero at all other
k’s. A special case is where the condition (7) holds. In this special case, the incremental
proﬁt is zero even at that k, so that adding one market does not improve the per-market
MCP. In all other cases, the per-market MCP increases.
The next result is about the MCP in the limit, showing that for relatively patient ﬁrms,
the diﬀerence between the expected proﬁt under full collusion and the MCP converges to
zero if the number of markets goes to inﬁnity. Namely, the collusion-deterrence eﬀects of
demand ﬂuctuations completely vanish in the limit.
Proposition 3 Let δ ∈ (δ, δ), and ﬁx ε > 0 arbitrarily. Then there exists M such that
for any M ≥ M , b∗M > πM − ε. In other words, limM→∞(πM − b∗M ) = 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
From the proof of Proposition 3, we see that the MCE when M is large enough sets
a proﬁt target greater than M
{
μˆπH + (1− μˆ)πL
}
, where μˆ > μ. That is, the per-market
target exceeds the average proﬁt from full collusion. By the law of large numbers, the
probability that the fraction of high-demand markets is greater than μˆ converges to zero,
if the number of markets goes to inﬁnity. In fact, the convergence is so fast that it converges
to zero even if it is multiplied by M . This implies that the ﬁrms can fully collude except
upon an event with a negligible probability, and that the expected eﬃciency loss due to
demand ﬂuctuations is also negligible. Hence, full collusion is approximately attained.
While Proposition 3 shows that πM − b∗M converges to zero as M → ∞, it is not
monotone. A good example is when (7) holds. Then we have β∗M = β
∗
M+1, and therefore




where the last inequality follows because full collusion is not sustainable for any δ ∈ (δ, δ).
We present some numerical analysis. Let us suppose πH = 15, πL = 10, and μ = 0.6,
which imply that π = 13 and δ = 15/28 	 0.5357. Table 1 exhibits the per-market MCP
under various numbers of markets and the minimum number of markets which makes b∗M
diﬀer from the expected proﬁt under full collusion (Mπ) by less than one, for various
discount factors. For instance, if δ = 0.52, the case where the ﬁrms are relatively patient,
having three markets allows them to obtain more than 38, while the expected proﬁt under
full collusion is 13 × 3 = 39. If they become less patient, the MCP decreases given the
number of markets, and they need a much greater number of markets in order to sustain
outcomes very close to full collusion. The case of δ = 125/246 is interesting in the sense
that the condition (7) holds when M = 2. Note that β∗2 = β∗3 in this case.
We conclude by emphasizing importance of the assumption that the demands are
independent across all markets.11 Namely, all demand shocks are idiosyncratic to each
market. To the extent that common macro shocks are present, the Rotemberg-Saloner
eﬀect (or collusion-deterrence due to ﬂuctuated demands) would not be “averaged out.”
11We are thankful to an anonymous referee for suggesting the arguments in this paragraph.
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Table 1: Numerical Analysis for πH = 15, πL = 10, and μ = 0.6
δ = 0.52 δ = 0.51 δ = 125246 δ = 0.505 δ = 0.501
β∗2 12.459 12.154 12.1 11.188 10.212
β∗3 12.742 12.287 12.1 11.802 10.615
β∗5 12.922 12.636 12.586 12.223 11.360
min{M : Mπ − b∗M < 1} 3 26 49 201 11566
This observation casts some doubts about validity of our limit result when the number of
markets goes to inﬁnity (Proposition 3). Imagine a process of adding new markets from
a pool of potential markets. As long as the number of markets is small, it may not be
diﬃcult to choose them so that all demand shocks are independent. As more and more
markets are added, however. such independence may be hard to maintain. Consequently,
our model might be most relevant when there are not so many markets. In this case, our
result on the eﬀect of adding one more market (Proposition 2) is most important.12
A Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2
Fix δ ∈ (δ, δ) and M ≥ 1. Let pl (l ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,M}) be the probability that l out of M
markets are in high demand, and let ql (l ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,M + 1}) be the probability that l




l(1− μ)M−l, ql = (M + 1)!
l!(M + 1− l)!μ
l(1− μ)M+1−l.
Note that from these, the following equations hold for any l ∈ {0, . . . ,M};
pl−1μΔl−1 + pl(1− μ)Δl
M
= ql
lπH + (M + 1− l)πL
M + 1
, plμ + pl+1(1− μ) = ql+1. (8)
Here, the convention is that p−1 = pM+1 = 0.
Since δ < δ < δ, we have πL < δβ∗M/(1− δ) < πH . Thus there exists kˆ ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,M}
such that





(kˆ + 1)πH + (M − kˆ)πL
M + 1
. (9)









12Further, the ﬁrms may want to divide existing markets into “submarkets,” in order to exploit the
eﬀects of multimarket contact. Of course, the performance of this strategy crucially depends on the nature
of demand shocks across the submarkets. They may even want to design the length of a period, in an
eﬀort to control the ﬂow of demand shocks.
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1− δ . (11)


























If (7) does not hold, (11) holds with strict inequality and so does (12). Comparing this
with (13), we obtain β∗M < β
∗
M+1 as desired. If (7) holds, note that this occurs only if
1 ≤ kˆ ≤ M − 1 because of MπL < δb∗M/(1 − δ) < MπH . Now (12) holds with equality.
Comparing this with (13) and applying Corollary 1, we obtain β∗M+1 = β
∗
M as desired.
B Appendix: Proof of Proposition 3
In what follows, let pMk be the probability that k out of M markets are in high demand.






μπH + (1− μ)πL
}
> μˆπH + (1− μˆ)πL.
It then follows that
δ
1− δ (πM − ε) > M
{
μˆπH + (1− μˆ)πL
}

























0, (Mμˆ− l)(πH − πL)
}]














0, l −Mμˆ} = 0. (14)
This is because we then obtain









for all large M . Hence, the equilibrium condition at πM − ε (namely, b(πM − ε) ≤ 0)
holds with strict inequality, so that Proposition 1 implies that b∗M > πM − ε for all large
M .





0, l −Mμˆ} = M∑
l=Mμˆ










(l + 1)(1− μ) <
(1− μˆ)μ
μˆ(1− μ) ≡ κ
for any l ≥ 









Therefore, it suﬃces to prove that MpMMμˆ goes to zero as M →∞.
Since μˆ is rational, two natural numbers y and Y exist such that μˆ = y/Y . Let us
consider the function f(z) = zy(1 − z)Y−y. Note that f is positive only when z ∈ (0, 1),
and that the ﬁrst-order condition on the range (0, 1) reduces to
y(1− z)− (Y − y)z = 0.







< 1− η. (15)
We also have












Mμˆ+ k)][∏Y−yk=1 (M − 
Mμˆ+ k)] (16)
for each M , because
⌈




Since Mμˆ ≤ 
Mμˆ < Mμˆ + 1 for any M , 
Mμˆ/M goes to μˆ as M → ∞. Applying
13
this to (16) and using (15), we have
lim
M→∞










Therefore, for any z = 1, 2, . . . , Y , (KY + z)pKY +z(KY +z)μˆ goes to zero as K → ∞. This
proves that MpMMμˆ goes to zero as M →∞.
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